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than if he were him8eyf to offer the evidence in an action against &
third person for criminal conversation. All this appears, too, in
the very case of Aorrig vs. Miller, if we are to take observations of
judges for law; for there, it is also said, that evidence of cohabita-
tion and repute is sufficient in all cases, but indictments for bigamy,
and actions for criminal conversation.
If we were to enter upon a course of fault-finding with judges,
living and dead, we might blame them for saying so many things
that are not law; but a more considerate view will show us, that
the full force of their minds is directed to arriving at right results ;
and that it is too much to ask of them, that everything they say
should be said with the precision which ought to attend the text of
an elementary author. But the writers of law treatises should be
more careful; they have not the excuse which judges have, and
they are understood to a1n at greater exactness. They would exer-
cise more care than sometimes they do, if it were not for the too
prevalent, erroneous opinion, that they arp entitled to shelter them-
selves behind the words of great judges. J. P. B.
SELECTION OF RECENT ADJUDGED POINTS IN EQUITY.
Account of Back Rents-Possession against Infant.-As a general rule
in cases of adverse possession, where there is no trust, no infancy, no fraud,
no suppression, but a mere bona fide possession, it is not the course of the
Court of Chancery to carry back the account of rents beyond the filing of
the bill. -Pulteney vs. Warren, 6 Yes. 93; Edwards vs. )lMorgan, 1
MI'Clel. 541. Whoever enters upon the estate of an infant, is held to
have entered as bailiff or guardian, and the subsistence of the relation
thus created by the entry, draws with it the right to a back acbount from
the time of the entry into possession, though by mistake. Drummond vs
2he Duke of St. Albans, 5 Yes. 433, may be considered as overruled.
Hicks vs. Sailitt, 3 De Gex, Mae. & Gord. 782.
Husband and Wife-Equity to a Settlement-Husband ioreigner domi-
ciled abroad-Domicil whether material.-In this case a motion was made
before Sir J. Stuart, V. C., that a sum of £2,623 l1s. lid., which had,
in an administration suit, been carried to the separate account of a married
lady-a German domiciled with her husband at Frankfort-should be paid
to her husband. An affidavit was produced, to the effect that no settle-
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ment had been executed on the lady's marriage; and also an affidavit of a
professor of law in Frankfort, that, in the absence of a settlement, the hus-
band, according to the law in force there, was entitled to the fund. His
honor, however, refused to make the order, and observed, that "the evi-
dence only showed, that the rights of the husband, according to the law of
Frankfort, were the same as the rights of the husband, according to the
law of England. The wife's equity to a settlement was an indulgence
allowed by the practice of this court, in derogation of the legal rights of
the husband. The evidence of the legal rights of the husband, according
to the country of the domicil, had nothing to do with it.'
With due deference, however, to the learned Vice Chancellor, 'the analogy
between the merely legal rights of an English husband, and the rights of
a foreign husband, seems scarcely to hold good;- because, in England, jus-
tice, as administered by Courts of Equity, forms part of the law of the
land, but not part of the law of other countries; unless, therefore (as is
not the case), the law of England is applicable to the personalty in Eng-
land of foreigners domiciled abroad, the analogy fails in a most material
point. However, both by the practice of the court, and by the well-known
principles of general jurisprudence, as no settlement had been made, and
as, according to the law of the domicil of the husband, the personalty in
question would have belonged to him, the order for payment to the hus-
band ought t6 have beeni made. For the practice, the reader is referred to
Sawyer vs. R7~ute, 1 Anst. 63; Campbell vs. Freik, 3 Ves. 323; Dues
vs. Smith, Jac. 544; Anstruther vs. Adair, 2 My. & K. 513; and Hitch-
cock vs. Clendinen, 12 Beav. 534; and Mr. Macqueen's valuable book on
the Law of Husband and Wife, p. 79. As to the general principles upon
which courts of justice deal with moveable property belonging to persons
having a foreign domicil, the reader is referred to extracts from the very
learned judgment of the Lord Justice Knight Bruce, when Vice Chancel-
lor, in the case of Guepratte vs. Young, infra, next case, which exhaust the
subject: one passage of Boullenois, cited by his lordship, at once disposes
of the remark of the Vice Chancellor, "that the legal rights of the hus-
band, according to the country of the domicil, had nothing to do with the
question." It is as follows: "Bona mobilia sequi et regulari debent
secundum statuta loci domicilii ejus ad quem pertinent vel spectant."
&wabacer vs. Becker, 2 Smale & Giff. Append. 6.
Husband and Wife--eversionary Interest in .Personalty of a Woman
mar-ied to a Foreigner domiciled abroad-Contract respecting, by what
law governed.-A contract was entered into in England, by a married
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woman, domiciled i France, respecting her reversionary interest in trust
money invested in the English Funds, which was invalid, according to the
English law, on account of the property being reversionary; and although
the same objection did not apply to the substance of the contract by the
French law, it was not entered into in the mannerprescribed by the French
law, which requires that there should be as many originl instruments as
there are distinct parties to the contract. It was, however, held by Sir J.
L. K. Bruce, V. C., that the French law gave capacity to the married
woman to enter into the contract, but that the English law regulated the
form of it, and that -therefore the contract was valid, and ought to be en-
forced by decree. "Under the kings of France;" said h s honor; "in the
seventeenth and the earlier part of the eighteenth century at least, it was
I believe, a general rule of French law (at least as to moveables), that 'Ila
loi du lieu oi se passe chaque acte en r6git la forme,' or, in the shorter
Latin phrase, locus regit actum. Of this there seems no room for reason-
able doubt. The maxim was frequently brought into action by the differ-
ent laws or customs under which different parts of the kingdom were,-
tho e of Poitou, for instance, differing from those of Brittany; those of
Champagne widely differing from both; while many proprietors having
residences and estates in two or more provinces, were often at Paris, where
a system of its own prevailed. The rule, however, I apprehend to be one,
not merely of French or of English law, but one of jurisprudence (in the
largest sense, at least so far as moveables and merely personal obligations
are concerned), nor applied merely where there is the intervention of public
functionaries, with reference to which it is not necessary to allude, as an
instance, to the acknowledged validity of a marriage contracted in Scotland
between persons domiciled elsewhere, in a manner allowed by the law of
that country. There 'may be exceptions from special reasons in particular
countries. The English law, for instance, with respect to wills of move-
ables, may be among them. But the existence of the rule, as a general
canon of jurisprudence is, I conceive, incontrovertible. My opinion is, I
repeat, with those who treat the 1825th article of the French Civil Code
as not barring or obstructing it. In the words of Modestinus'-'Nifila
juris ratio aut oequitatis benignitas patitur ut qum salubriter pro utilitate
hominum introducuntur, ea nos duriore interpretatione contra ipsorum
commodum producamus ad severitatem.' I am convinced by the evidencE
before me, that if a French citizen, capable by the French law to contract,
who is residing temporarily, but not domiciled in a country not his own,
makes in that country, with a person there domiciled, a contract relating to
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moveables, and the contract is made in such a form, and accompanied with
such ceremonies (though private only) as to render it valid and binding,
according to the law of that country (applicable to persons whose capacity
to coitract that law recognizes), the contract binds the Frenchman wherever
the moveables may be. But especially if, when the contract was made,
the moveables were in the country where it was made, and this, though the
contract be a synallagmatic contract, and the requisitions and conditions
of the 1325th article be omitted and disregarded, the agreement would,
therefore, if made in France, not have bound him. The proposition
assumes, of course, a capacity to contract on the part of each of the con-
tracting parties-assumes the fairness of the contract, and assumes that it
does not infringe good morals, or the law, or public policy of either coun-
try; all which assumptions may, I think, with propriety and truth, be
made in favor of the transaction of November, 1844;" under consideration.
....... It is unnecessary to refer to Boullenois, and other well-known
writers of authority on the subject, who are decisive if they can properly
be invoked. But, though it is probably quite as unnecessary, I will employ
a minute" or two in stating.three or four maxims or aphorisms, more ques-
tionable, perhaps, in point of latinity, thian of any solid or important ground,
which are, I believe, of general acceptance, generally true and consistent
with each other in theory and practice. I mean these:-
8 'Statuta suo clauduntur territorio' nee ultr.l territorium disponunt.
"'Bona mobilia sequi et regulari debent secundum statuta loci domicilii
ejus ad quem pertinent vel speotant.
"'Si lex actui formam dat inspiciendus eat locus aetfis non domicilii.
"'Si de solemnibus qumritur aut de modo actfts ratio ejus loci habenda
eat ubi celebratur.'
"I have but one superfluous word more to say before passing to another
part of the case. It is notoriously of continual practice in this court to
deal with the personal property of married women, domiciled elsewhere
than in England, otherwise than it would be dealt with were they domi-
ciled in England; to do so, merely by reason of the domicil. The law of
the -country of the domicil being attended to, a husband not domiciled
here, often, as we all kndw, exercises powers, and obtains benefits, which
an English husband could not.' Guepratte vs. Young, 4 De Gex &
S. 217.
Mortgagor and Mortgagee-Power *of Sale-Notice-Infant Heir oj
Mortgagor.-In a mortgage deed, it was required that notice of a sale
under the power therein contained should be given to the mortgagor, his
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heirs or assigns. The mortgagor died, leaving an infant heir. It was
held, by Sir It. T. Kindersley, V. C., that notice to the infant heir and his
guardian was good notice. Tracey vs. Lauwrence, 2 Drew. 403.
Mortgagor and Mortgagee- atute of Limitations-Mortgagee in P o-
sesswon-Acknowledgment of Mortgage.-A mortgagee had been more than
twenty years in possession when the mortgagor's solicitor wrote to the
mortgagee, on the 2d of February, 1852, requesting to kuow when he
could see him as to his claims on the mortgaged property. The mortgagee
wrote a letter in reply, dated the 5th of the same month, in which he said,
"I do not see the use of a meeting unless some party is ready with the
money to pay me off." It was held by the Lords Justices, affirming the
decision of the Master of the Rolls, that the letter of the mortgagee was a
sufficient acknowledgment in writing to exclude the Statute of Limitations,
although not written within twenty years after the mortgagee had entered
into possession. "It appears to me," observed Lord Justice Knight Bruce,
"that the writer of the letter of the 5th of February, acknowledges by it
that he holds a redeemable estate in the property to which it relates, that
is, that he holds it by way of mortgage. It is said, however, that this
does not answer the requisitions of the statute, and that there is nbt here
any acknowledgment of the title of the mortgagor, or of the right of re-
demption given to the mortgagor, or some person claiming his estate, or
to the agent of such mortgagor or person;" and it is contended that the
right of the particular person must be acknowledged. But I think that,
according to the true construction of the letter of the 5th of February, it
must be understood as acknowledging a title to redeem in the person or
persons on whose behalf the letter of the 2d was written, to which the let-
ter of the 5th was an answer. I am of opinion that the decree at the
Rols was correct, and that the appeal ought to be dismissed, with costs."
Stansfield vs. Hobson, 3 De Gex, Mac. & Gord. 620.
Mortgage of Wif's separate Estate--Pesumption that Wife was Surety
for Husband.-A husband and wife joined in raising money upon a mort-
gage of the wife's separate estate, by a deed, which stated that the money
was advanced to both, and contained a covenant by the husband for pay-
ment of principal and interest. The husband having appointed his wife
executrix, she paid off the mortgage debt ou of the general assets, and
took a re-assignment to herself of the mortgaged premises. The testator's
assets being insufficient to pay his debts in full, a question was raised by
a simple contract creditor whether the mortgage debt ought to have been
paid in priority to his simple contract debts. It was held, by Sir W.
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Page Wood, V. C., first, that a-presumption arose which might be rebutted
by extrinsic evidence that the payment of the mortgage money was made
to the use of the husband; secondly, that, in the absence of such evidence,
the wife was only surety for her husband, and was entitled after his death,
as against the other creditors, to all the rights incident to that relation,
and was therefore entitled to have the mortgage paid off out of her hus-
band's assets, as a specialty debt, in priority to his simple contract cre-
ditors. "The point," said his honor, "has never been actually decided"
as between the husband's other creditors and the wife's estate; but in Tate
vs. Austin, 1 P. Wins. 264; 2 Vern. 689, Lord Cowper said that the wife
had the right of a surety, except as against onerous creditors of her hus-
band, and that as against them she had not such rights. Lord Thurlow,
in Clinton vs. Hooper, 1 Ves. jun. 187; 3 Brb. C. C. 200, noticed that
dictum in Tate vs. Austin, and said that he regarded the doctrine as then
settled, his words being: "The rule I take to be universally this-that the
title she has is precisely the same as that of an heir-at-law; because, in
Tate vs. Austin, though not the question in the cause, and consequently
not weighed upon hrgument, yet the court was very clear that the wife
cannot insist upon being paid in preference to onerous creditors." His
honor, noticing that this also was a mere dictum of Lord Thurlow's, added,
"It is necessary, therefore, to look at the reason of the rule, and see how
far it applies to a case where the wife's property issettled to her separate
use. All the decisions on this question 'have been in cases in which the
wife's property was not settled to her separate use, but in which the wife,
having unsettled freehold property, by levying a fine or otherwise, has
made a charge upon such property; and it was in reference to such a case
that Lord Thurlow said, in Clinton vs. ifooper, 1 Ves. jun. 187, that it
might seem hard upon the wife, but an assumpsit could not be raised as
between her and her husband; and he said, "I have put it as between heir
and executor, as the cases oblige me to put it, for the reason mentioned,
because an assumpsit between husband and wife will not be raised more in
equity than at law." And in commenting upon The Earl of KAnnoul vs.
Money, 3 Swanst. 202, in which Lord Camden intimated a different view,
because he said that the court regards the husband and wife as two distinct
.parties in such a case, saying, according to the note of that case in Mr.
Swanston's Reports, that the court, as it were, dissolves the marriage quoad
the transaction. Lord Thurlow observed, "Perhaps it is considered rather
too figuratively, in saying the marriage is dissolved in that respect. That
is not in Mr. Ord's note, nor any trace of it in Tate vs. Austin, and the
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other cases. They say the court will not infer an equitable dssumpsit
contrary to the tenor of the obligation subsisting between husband and
wife, who cannot contract with each other directly without trustees."
"Whatever should ultimately be held to be the law in this respect, and
I think that there will be some difficulty in supporting these dicta, although
by such eminent judges, it is clear that no question. as to assumpsit can
exist where the estate is settled to the separate use of the wife. That is a
case in which the court recognizes her as a feme sole, competent to deal
with her property in every respect; and therefore an assumpsit would arise
just as though she were a mere stranger. A wife, effecting a charge upon
her separate property in favor of her husband, is precisely in the same
position as though she had lent to him the savings of the income of such
property deposited at her bankers, and which there is no doubt that he
can lawfully borrow from her. She stands in the very position, with re-
spect to her separate property, which Lord Thurlow says is too figurative
a description of her position in the other case. It must be observed, how-
ever, that it is difficult to see on what other grounds, except that of an
implied assumpsit, this doctrine of her right as surety ever arose. The
wife is not in the mere position of the heir, for the heir cannot assert his
right against legatees, but the wife can; and how she can acquire a better
position than the heir, except by such an assumpsit, it is not easy to un-
derstand. Where the wife has separate estate, then, as it is laid down in
Parteriche vs. Powlet, 2 Atk. 883, her separate property being applied to
pay off the husband's debts, the wife must be considered as a distinct per-
son, and is equally entitled to stand in the place of the husband's creditors
as a stranger; and, according to the dictum in Robinson vs. Gee, 1 Ves.
252, if her mortgage to secure her husband's debt is paid off out of his
assets, the other creditors of the husband have no equity, in case of a defi-
ciency of his assets, to come upon her estate.
"The choice of the mortgage creditor cannot make a distinction on any
principle; and, therefore, Lord Hardwicke seems to have held, that, even
in the case contemplated by Lord Thurlow in a different view, no such
right can exist on the part of the general creditors. The only way in
which any question as regards the right of the creditors could arise seemed
to me to be, as in Copis vs. Middleton, T. & R. 224, whether payment of
the debt might not reduce the surety to the position of a *simple contract
creditor. However, that doctrine would not apply to a case where an exe-
cutrix paid her testator's debt, because she would be entitled, independently
of her rights as a surety, to be recouped out of the testator's estate, and,
for that purpose, to stand in the place of the.party so paid." Hudson vs.
Carnziclaael, 1 Kay, 613.
